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Civic Culture: Public Opinion and the Resurgence of Civic Culture
Yuri Levada
There has hardly been a stretch in Russian history more saturated with
sweeping changes than the period between 1988-1993. Packed into this
exceedingly brief historical era are the rise of "perestroika" and the fall of
its illustrious leader, Mikhail Gorbachev; the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the emergence in its place of 15 independent states; the August '91
communist putsch and the democrats' triumphant ascension to power; the
proliferation of virulent ethnic conflicts and the recognition of the abiding
need for cooperation; the bloody October '93 confrontation between the
executive and legislative powers and the surprising strength that the
nationalist and communist forces showed in the first multi-party
Parliamentary elections in post-communist Russia . As people watched
their political elites reshuffled and familiar institutions crumble, they could
not help feeling alternatively elated, confused, and disillusioned. No
sooner hopes for a democratic renewal were raised than they were dashed
by the unexpected hardships which made some feel nostalgic for the lost
security of the communist system.
As we try to take stock of these changes and assess their impact on
Russian political culture, we should realize that the institutional
transformations tell us only half the story. Hidden behind the visible
structural dislocations are less apparent and often confusing trends in
public consciousness. To appraise the state of public mind in today's
Russia , we need to draw on public opinion surveys. In particular, we shall
draw on the data collected by the National Center for Public Opinion
Research that has been tracking political developments in the former
Soviet Union since the early years of perestroika. [1]
Among the changes that have shaken Soviet society in the last few years,
none is more important than the breakdown of the communist party's
monopoly on power. The one-party state might be history now, but the
political tradition in which it was rooted is not. This tradition predates the
Soviet Union and extends much further into Russian history. Thus, today's
reformers have to grapple not only with the totalitarian institutions built in
the communist era, but also with the authoritarian practices that have
existed in Russia for centuries. Far from being destroyed, the old
totalitarian structures and authoritarian mentalities have demonstrated a
remarkable capacity for social mimicry and adaptability. Undemocratic
political sensibilities are manifest in the institutions of mass

communications, while old stereotypes continue to dominate public
opinion. Reasons for the persistence of the old attitudes should be sought
in the Russian political tradition, in the nation's civic culture that was
retained and amplified by the Soviet regime. Authoritarianism sustained
by both violence and pervasive paternalism, nearly universal disregard for
legal norms and procedures, intolerance toward dissent -- these are
among the most salient features of Russian civic culture. On the one hand,
this culture breeds widespread fear, obedience, and sycophancy, but on
the other, it encourages rebellion and contempt for any authorities and
law among the Russians. We must bear in mind this political heritage
when we contemplate the most recent upheavals in Russian history. At
the same time, we should not gloss over real, if contradictory and painful,
changes that Russian civic culture has undergone in recent years.
"Political participation," "political support," "public trust" -- these worn-out
cliches have acquired a decidedly new meaning since democratic reforms
began to transform Russia. Just a few years ago, "participation" and
"support" were arbitrarily invoked by the Communist party whenever it
wished to turn on the mechanisms of "double-think" and "unanimity." Now
people in Russia have an opportunity to stake out their own political
position and develop a conscious attitude toward politicians, parties, and
social events, including the option of withdrawing their trust altogether.
The traditional preference for unanimity remains strong and the choices
practically available to the individual are quite limited, but the very fact
that there is a choice in political matters is undeniable.
We can isolate three stages in the nation's political development since
1985. The first stage coincides with Gorbachev's perestroika and is
distinguished by the half-hearted efforts to reform the Soviet system from
above and from within by using the leverages provided by the system
itself. Systematic opinion surveys that began in earnest at this period
point to the growing prestige of Gorbachev and his politics, the expansion
of glasnost in the public domain, and the rising hopes (especially among
the intelligentsia) for liberal reform. The key question that roused the
public at this point was: "Who is to blame?" That is the question familiar
to several generations of Russian reformist intellectuals who have
searched for ways to apportion blame for the nation's sorry state. The list
of suspects submitted in the late 80s included communist political leaders
charged with distorting the "true" socialist model. All critics -- from the
top party brass to extreme Russian nationalists to liberal dissidents -singled out Stalin as the major culprit. This was a neat way to exonerate
oneself from responsibility and to spare the system's fundamental political

institutions from serious criticism.
Research findings from this period support this view. In 1988, 13%
percent of Soviet citizens named Stalin and his legacy as the main cause
of the country's problems. This figure grew to 35% in 1989. Similarly,
Gorbachev's popularity among his countrymen peaked in 1988 at 51%,
and the interest and trust in the mass media crested in 1989. After that,
perestroika ran out of steam, the Soviet leader's popularity plummeted,
and radical reform ideas gained in prominence.
The second stage in Russia 's political transformation raised another
question: "Who is to be trusted?" Since 1990, Boris Yeltsin took the center
stage as the new man of the year -- first, as the proponent of a more
radical approach to perestroika and later, as a radical democratic
reformer. The political forces shaping public opinion underwent significant
transformation in this period. The reform alliance that gave perestroika its
initial thrust and helped to legitimize it faded from the public scene. The
public lost interest in the critical press and its endless exposes of past
abuses. Faced with rising tide of militant nationalism, the looming
prospects of authoritarianism, and the imminent breakdown of the Soviet
Union , reform intellectuals retreated in disarray. The high point of this
second stage was the August '91 putsch, when communist party
apparatchiks made a desperate attempt to reclaim power, followed by a
radical counter-putsch engineered by Yeltsin and his democratic
supporters. The Soviet period in the Russian history officially ended here,
but some of its key institutions and mentalities have persisted. Our polls
show that Yeltsin's popularity peaked in July 1990, when he was elected
to chair the Russian Parliament. This finding suggests that Yeltsin
appealed to the people first and foremost as a radical opposition leader.
As the public began to lose its interest in political debunking and in stories
about the Stalinist excesses, the new stage of Russia 's political
transformation commenced. This third stage, which dated back to the
early 1992, placed on the agenda another question well known to the
Russian reform-minded intellectuals: "What is to be done?" The answer
was sought not so much in digging out new enemies and plotting new
revolutions as in freeing prices from state control, encouraging private
enterprise, and granting more autonomy to regional authorities. The
liberal policies pursued at this stage tended to be idealistic, impractical,
and sometimes downright irrational. Liberalism and state reforms clearly
parted company. Meanwhile, the populace shunned ideology and gave the
sacramental formula "What is to be done" a pragmatic reading, doing

what it could to muddle through everyday life.
Such a turn of events was particularly painful for an authoritarian society.
Ever since Russia embarked on the course of modernization some 150
years ago, it relied exclusively on authoritarian means to move the
country forward. Perestroika and post-perestroika reformers acted in the
same tradition, seeking to impose reforms from above. By the end of
1992, support for political institutions and leaders hit a new low. Spurred
by the ex-liberal scandal-mongering oppositional press, public
consciousness turned against all politicians and reforms. Perestroika
intellectuals grew increasingly angry, aggressive, and divisive. No national
leader or political group seemed capable of commanding authority and
providing moral guidance. But then again, the state resources for
ramming social reforms down society's throat were exhausted -- the fact
that political leaders had a hard time to digest.
This is not to say that the people deserted their reform leaders altogether.
They still could lend their support to Yeltsin at a critical juncture, as they
did during the April '93 national referendum and once again -- for a short
period only -- during the October 93 showdown between the President and
the Parliament. But their skepticism about Yeltsin's program remained
palpable, as they resented the high inflation and unemployment fostered
by reform policies. Public consciousness became thoroughly deideologized,
and the absence of credible political programs or leaders did not seem to
alarm Russian citizens.
As most societies trying to shake their totalitarian legacy, today's Russia is
propelled forward not by a coherent reform program but by the confluence
of events, circumstances, and unexpected crises necessitating ad hoc
solutions and improvisations. Throughout this seemingly haphazard
development, however, one can detect a trend toward the
structuralization of society -- a trend especially important in a country that
suppressed independent interest groups in the past. In the political
sphere, new parties began to emerge, which formed the nucleus of the
future pluralistic politics. Economic interest groups grew conscious of their
particular agenda and sought to consolidate their influence through
various organizational outlets. In the area of norms and values, society
emancipated itself from the patronage of the state which used to mandate
values for its citizens. [2] Universal human values and negotiated norms
of everyday life emerged as alternative sources of legitimation in society.
Opinion surveys from this period give further substance to this
generalization. Let us take a closer look at the process of political

differentiation as captured in our findings.
The National Center for Public Opinion Research has tracked public
attitudes toward political life in Russia for several years, and as Table 1
shows (see appendix), the participatory spirit essential to democracy has
been slow to emerge.
As you can see, there is a marked drop in the number of "veterans" as
well as "newcomers" to politics. The percentage of those who is
disappointed with or lost interest in politics is increasing. At the same
time, there are fewer individuals who find the political process closed to
them. It is not so much the inaccessibility of politics that presents a
challenge to Russian democracy as the lack of sustained interest in
political matters. Further details could be gleaned from the age
distribution of the respondents. At the early stages of political reforms in
Russia , those reporting a high level of political participation were
primarily individuals aged 40-50. Toward the end of the period in
question, politically active individuals were primarily those 55 years and
older. That is to say, respondents reporting high political participation
tended to be older. By contrast, individuals who lost their interest in or
were disappointed with politics were often young, followed by the middleaged group. Those who felt that they exerted no influence on politics were
also likely to be young and, toward the end of the period, middle-aged.
A few words on such terms as "politics," "public life," "political
participation," as well as "the fate of your nation" are in order here. The
meaning of these terms underwent considerable changes between 1988
and 1992. During the Soviet era, "politics" meant something official and
imposed from above on a common citizen. It included obligatory meetings
and officially sanctioned demonstrations declaring unanimous support for
the government, plus the Young Communist League's pseudo-popular
initiatives. In the early glasnost era that fell between 1987 and 1988,
public consciousness was agitated and politicized. This was especially
apparent among the young people and the so-called "60's generation" -dissident intellectuals whose formative years coincided with the
Khrushchev thaw. Political clubs and seminars sprang up throughout the
country, with the participants making daring (by the standards of the
time) speeches and proposing novel political schemes. The circle of people
united into these groups was fairly narrow, but their influence was
growing rapidly, spurred in part by the liberal press. This liberal "club
culture" operated with the approval of Communist party reformers, who
tried to stir the debates towards "constructive channels" and keep reforms
within the basic framework of the Soviet system of government. Later on,

mass political movements would begin to gather force, bringing in their
wake semi-open elections and ethnic conflicts. The political process could
no longer be controlled from one center, yet it did not acquire stable
features of a multi-party system. With the Communist party exiting center
stage after August '91, the political vacuum ensued, and it has not been
filled since. After all, the CPSU was not a political but a state monopoly
structure; the absence of viable political institutions and organizations
simply became more apparent since the Communist party's sudden
collapse.
Totalitarian societies tend to confer the "political" status on each and
every problem facing the nation, yet they remain profoundly apolitical -not just because the masses of people are politically disenfranchised, but
because no real political interests are allowed to crystallize and acquire a
stable organizational form. Where everything is declared to be political,
especially every initiative undertaken by the extant powers, nothing
qualifies as a genuinely political event. Politics, state, constitution, election
-- all these phenomena are robbed of their political content, while public
and private life, as well as ideology and economics, are radically conflated.
To be sure, a purely totalitarian society has hardly ever existed. Any
concrete historical polity has to compromise its principles for the sake of
efficiency, and Soviet society was no exception to this rule. The so called
"stagnation period" in Soviet history was filled with such compromises and
inconsistencies. It can be seen as the practical limit of adaptability that a
totalitarian society could reach in its efforts to appear normal and civilized
(hence the ironic label: "Stalinism with the human face"). The dissolution
of totalitarian structures spurs the differentiation of public and private
spheres, of political, economic, social, cultural and other institutions which
hitherto merged into each other. Judge from the available data, this
process of differentiation is now under way, albeit it moves sluggishly, and
it is marred with many contradictions.
Perestroika stimulated the politization of Russian society but it failed to
create a viable political structure. We can see this era as the period of
primary politization or political agitation. (I deliberately avoid talking
about "awakening" or "renaissance," because these terms imply that some
dormant political structures were waiting to be reignited -- a wrong
assumption in the case of post-Soviet society). During this stage, the
party-state apparatus continued to hold the monopoly on power and to
impede the formation of independent political parties and groups. The
pyramid of power had the Communist party at the top and no free

elections were possible.
The first sign of change was the shift in public attitudes toward the
traditional power structures, which was accompanied by the weakening of
the totalitarian monolith. Soviet citizens might have laughed at their
leaders in the privacy of their homes but they obeyed the authorities in
public. In the post-Soviet era, the powers no longer had to be taken
seriously, and as more and more people effectively ignored the
government orders, the power had lost its effectiveness. The attitude
toward politics was now comprised of two elements: passive identification
with certain leaders (which did not differ much from the old Soviet
attitude) and political agitation (or mobilization) whipped up by
perestroika reforms. Both elements were doomed to disappear once real
political structures began to take shape. The mass politization inevitably
led to the disappointment in the quasi-politics that marked the transitional
period between totalitarianism and democracy. All changes that
perestroika brought about in the political domain -- elections, parties,
demonstrations -- bore the mark of their origins and remained essentially
quasi-political and unstable. Sooner or later, the primary politization of
society would have to give way to the formation of a civic culture and
genuine political structures that reflect diverse political interests and make
multi-party, pluralistic polity possible. There were signs that such
structures began to form after 1989, but these were very early and
distressingly weak portends.
If stable and working political structures are so hard to come by in today's
Russian politics, it is because the political interests that these structures
are supposed to represent are still largely nascent and inchoate. Nor is
there a viable political milieu -- the middle class -- where such interests
would have a chance to crystalize. Not only coherent political platforms
are missing from the Russia 's political scene; political slogans, concepts,
ideas around which stable political groupings could form remain barely
audible. There is no dearth of new political headings and noisy statements
but what exactly they stand for in terms of specific policies is very hard to
fathom. When a political party or group declared itself in the old
Parliament, it was usually a byproduct of the latest schism in the
parliamentary politics and not an indication that the party expressed the
interests of a certain constituency and intended to press for an electoral
victory.
Current public opinion surveys show that the political divisions do not so
much reflect the political differentiation in the country as they reveal the
latest swing in the popularity of a particular leader or group. As long as

society remains organized around the structures of power -- popular or
not -- it will not know genuine pluralism and political consolidation.
The current difficulties with building a viable political culture in Russia
have one unsettling consequence: the disenchantment with democracy
and the paucity of legitimate political structures. The bridge that was
supposed to link the old and the new Russia has gone only half way, never
reaching the other side. The politics in the transitional period breeds
discontent, provokes frequent crises, and obscures the criteria by which
one could judge the progress toward democracy. Especially distraught and
disappointed are those circles which succumbed to initial euphoria and
developed unrealistic hopes for the imminent reforms. I am talking about
the country's reform-minded political elites and liberal post-dissident
intellectuals, including the emigre circles, which exerted a certain
influence on the politics in the transitional period. If you look at rank and
file individuals, those normally reached by pollsters, you find a far greater
stability in mood over the period under study. One could even speak about
certain socio-psychological types of responses to political turmoil, which
seem quite independent from the nature of events. Instructive in this
respect are the answers to the following survey question: "Which mood
has been most common last year among the people you know?" (see table
2 in appendix).
Why did the leaders who came into prominence on the wave of
perestroika fail to hold on to power? Quite apart from their personal
dispositions, they were selected for the deconstructive role. They helped
tear down the old political institutions, but they proved inept when it came
to the constructive task of building up new political structures. This
deconstructive thrust of the early perestroika reformers reflected the gap
between the "can-do" self-image they communicated to their followers
and their far more limited practical skills and personal abilities. These
leaders were sold on the idea that Soviet socialism could be rejuvenated,
that they were the movers and shakers behind the reforms, that they
could cleanse the "true Leninism" from the Stalinist distortions and return
the country to the pristine sources of communist ideology. All innovations
that sprang to life during the Gorbachev era -- the opening up of the mass
media, elections featuring alternative candidates, campaigns against
corruption and bureaucratic excesses -- were animated by the idea of
reclaiming the revolutionary past, with the party apparatus posing as the
prime engine for this renewal. The 1989-90 national election campaign
was dominated by the leaders who were brought to power with the
Communist party's tacit or open approval and who were looking to the
past rather than to the future for their programmatic statements. When

the totalitarian structures crumbled, however, they were entirely
unprepared to offer constructive policies and assume the mantle of
leadership. Not even dissident intellectuals, with a few notable exceptions,
were free from the liberal Soviet mentality of renewal and restoration. All
reforms were to be imposed from above by the wise leaders drawn from
the educated strata of intellectuals.
Meanwhile, the foundations of Soviet socialism and the international
empire it fostered collapsed much faster than anybody thought possible.
And as soon as it became clear that the hopes for a smooth transition to
freedom and prosperity were widely exaggerated, the old style leaders
and their institutions came under attack. Very quickly, they turned from
facilitators into a stumbling block impeding reforms. The reformist
alliance, which included party reformers, liberal democratic intelligentsia,
and nationalistic forces, came apart. Each group formed its own power
centers, however poorly organized, and each was distinguished by
vociferous attacks on the state and the executive power. The key divide
between the political forces at the time was the line between the radical
pragmatic reformers who gathered around the executive power and
various oppositional currents. Among the most salient manifestations of
this division was the confrontation between the presidential and
parliamentary branches of power that came to a head in 1993.
Those leaders who failed to transcend their perestroika-from-above
illusions disappeared from the political scene. Such was the fate of party
reformers and intellectuals gathered around Gorbachev. Others joined
newly founded factions and groups. Gorbachev's demise could be
attributed to the rise of Yeltsin who presented himself to the nation as a
more radical reformer. But the drop in popularity that Yeltsin's
government suffered in 1993 suggested that the country was ready for a
new form of leadership and political organization.
The Soviet Union has always been a "mobilized society," i.e., society
based on political activism organized from above and controlled by the
hierarchy of state power. The political regimes that governed Russia
throughout much of its history relied on force, propaganda, and
centralized control to keep the country moving. Unorganized and
undifferentiated masses of people were to be brought into action and
compelled toward the goal set forth by the higher authorities. Intellectual
and moral resources were mobilized in the same way as any other, with
the intelligentsia enlisted to do the powers' bidding. Mobilization is the
only form in which a totalitarian society could exists. By contrast, civil
society is possible only where interest groups and autonomous civic

structures are allowed to flourish, where individual interests have a
chance to be articulated and communicated to others. To be sure,
mobilized and civil societies are but ideal types that approximate reality in
all its richness and possibilities. Yet, these are useful models that help us
understand the nature of political processes in the transitional period.
Both the theory and practice of mobilized society implied that the political
masses are passive and pliable, that the power mechanisms must be
turned on to push them in the right direction. Characteristically,
Bolsheviks favored such terms as "levers," "transmitting belts," "cogs,"
etc., which underscored their philosophical commitment to the
mobilizational ethics of government. Despotism and coercion endemic to
the Russian political tradition might account for the ruthlessness with
which the Bolsheviks set out to realize their mechanical model of
mobilizational politics. This model had three principal components:
omnipotent power, subservient people, and since the middle of the 19th
century, intelligentsia. In recent years, the role of direct coercion and
fear-fostering propaganda has diminished. The "transmitting belts," to use
Lenin's favorite expression, have been loosened up. But the Russian polity
has not shaken fully the mobilizational structures and certainly not the old
mobilizational mentality. This is evident in the fact that agitation and
apathy -- the two states most common in a mobilizational society -- are
characteristic of post-Soviet society, where emotional excitement and
moral tension are typically followed by periods of depression and asthenic
apathy.
The mobilizational thrust of recent Russian reforms was apparent in the
Gorbachev era, and it was especially evident in the propaganda
technology used by the elites. The mobilizational mechanisms weakened
afterwards, but they were still working during the August '91 putsch and
the April 1993 national referendum. In both cases society was mobilized in
the face of attempts to restore the old regime, even though most people
lost their early enthusiasm about reforms. Still, this was mobilizational
activism and not the kind of steady participatory practice that undergirds
democratic politics. Except for the nationalistic and ethnic movements that
unite the constituency around the idea of the opposition to the center and
local sovereignty, alternative forms of political participation remain in the
rudimentary stage. The path from a mobilizational political culture to a
participatory civil society is yet to be charted in the post-Soviet era.
Now, if we take a closer look at the Russian political elites, we can see
that their evolution mirrors the problems facing the society that seeks to
shed the old and build a new civic culture. Soviet society had two kinds of

elites: power elite and cultural elite (the intelligentsia). Both suffered a
serious setback in the current political crisis. Following the tradition of
Russian intelligentsia, Soviet intellectuals sought to modernize the state
and its citizens. They provided intellectual and moral legitimation to the
powers and at the same time served, though to a lesser degree, as the
critics of the system. The Soviet intelligentsia owed to the state its
ideological, political, and economic autonomy, which is why it aimed
primarily at the liberal rationalization of the regime. Perestroika spurred
the intelligentsia's illusions that a wise reformer, drawing expert advice,
could revamp Russian society. Glasnost encouraged intellectuals to believe
that they would be the experts called upon to provide the high-brow
theoretical rationale for the reforms. Yet, intellectuals hardly qualified for
this role, since few of them possessed expert knowledge adequate to the
task at hand. That is not to gainsay the key, indeed crucial, role that the
intelligentsia played in stirring public opinion and mobilizing society in the
early perestroika years. But this was the intelligentsia's swan song. The
crisis of perestroika in 1990-91 lead to the disillusionment among
intellectuals who, along with other national elites, were given to profound
pessimism about the country's future. The very triangular structure of
power that carried the Russian polity through more than a century -power-people-intelligentsia -- has collapsed.
Highly instructive in this respect is the fate of glasnost. Perestroika's
major and most enduring accomplishment, glasnost lost its luster in the
post-perestroika period. The freedom of speech, publications, and
gathering is still in place, but its role as a central factor in public life is
diminishing. The uncensored word lost its capacity to rouse imagination,
spur the public into action. The public takes glasnost for granted, if not
views it with suspicion. This is probably how it should be in a normal
democratic society, where glasnost serves its informational, aesthetic, and
other functions. But Russian society today is hardly a functional
democracy, and the indifference to free speech is a symptom of the
underlying crisis.
As the democratic process continues, the Russian intelligentsia is likely to
lose its traditional mobilizing role and turn into an educated cultural and
technical elite. Intellectuals are bound to become specialists, that is, if
Russian society evolves into a participatory democracy. If it follows a
different type of development, the intelligentsia will continue to vacillate
between despair and patriotic messianism. In any event, there is no
return to the traditional triangular power structure.
For the first time in Soviet history, perestroika transformed Russian

politicians from larger than life figures exemplifying a particular cause into
a flesh and blood individuals with some clearly visible strengths and all too
apparent weaknesses. Gorbachev, Ligachev, Sakharov, Yeltsin (and I
should add, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and some other western
politicians) -- these were concrete individuals who could not hide
themselves behind the carefully polished images, who thrust themselves
into the public eye by virtue of their willingness to take a stance, to
venture a personal and sometimes unpopular opinion. The negative side of
this development was the personalization of politics. The political divisions
were defined as personal confrontations between Gorbachev and Ligachev,
Sakharov and Gorbachev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and so forth. However,
in the post-perestroika years, all politicians suffered in public opinion,
their popularity taking a dramatic plunge. Here are the ratings that the
two most prominent Russian politicians were given in a series of polls
identifying man of the year (see table 3 in the appendix).
The 1992 figures show that barely one sixth of all those polled gave their
vote to the man of the year. Three times as many votes went to Yeltsin
during the April 1993 referendum, but this figure reflected the
mobilizational agitation that preceded this referendum. Once the political
strain subsided, the leaders lost their appeal in the pubic eye. Now we
have clear signs that the politics is getting more and more depersonalized,
that leadership structure and legitimation patterns are undergoing
systemic change.
Soviet society produced not so much political leaders as party bosses
whose legitimacy derived from their allegiance to the party cause and
personal connections to the higher layers of power. The popular image
was important to the party bosses, who cultivated it assiduously through
propaganda and mass media (Stalin's cult of personality is most revealing
in this respect). But their "personal charisma" did not precede their ascent
to power; rather, it devolved on them after they entrenched themselves in
the power structure.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin are the last two Soviet-style leaders in
contemporary Russian politics, though their ascent to power followed
different paths. Gorbachev received his leadership mantle from the
Communist party. He tried to legitimize his power as the president elected
by the Parliament, but his efforts proved a failure. Yeltsin came to national
prominence as a party maverick and an opposition leader. Later on, he
was chosen by popular vote as the president of the Russian Federation .
He assumed real power after the August '91 putsch and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union . Along with the mantle of leadership, he inherited the

"secondary charisma" that belonged to and protected anyone who
controlled the state machinery. In 1993, with the state machinery
sputtering, Yeltsin's popularity ratings began to slide.
The crisis of power that unfolded in late 1993 dramatized the crisis of the
old political culture and all its peculiar modes of legitimation, support
mobilization, and political leadership. To grasp the meaning of the bloody
confrontation between the President and the Parliament we need to go
back to the earlier socio-political developments, beginning with the
collapse of the party-state hegemony. These tragic events are but a stage
in the ongoing political and constitutional crisis that will, in all likelihood,
continue for months and years. The 1993 summer opinion surveys show
the public clamoring for law and order as a counterbalance to the
mounting chaos and anarchy. To a society that never lived under a
genuine constitution and frequently spurned the rule of law, the dictatorial
means seemed a fair price to pay for instituting an order. When
confronted with a choice between authoritarian rule by President Yeltsin
and a military dictatorship by ex-communists, the first choice -government by presidential dictate -- was given a clear preference. The
populace still saw Yeltsin as the best hope for political and economic
reforms. Yeltsin's decision to dissolve and later to storm Parliament should
be seen against the backdrop of this popular support for strong actions
designed to restore order without turning back the wheel of history. Our
data show that in the beginning of October, the majority (52 percent) of
the Russian population generally supported Yeltsin's decision to do away
with the old Parliament, while 24 percent of the respondents opposed his
action. Yeltsin's decision drew a particularly strong approval from college
educated people (61 percent supported and 20 percent disapproved the
action), whereas less educated respondents, those without a high school
diploma, showed the least enthusiasm for the radical course of action (44
percent approved and 28 percent disapproved Yeltsin's decision). Nobody
anticipated that the confrontation between the President and the
Parliament would take a bloody turn, and most likely nobody wanted the
showdown to go that far, but the configuration of political forces and
public opinion in the nation compelled the course of events. Public opinion
in Russia took the side of the President and generally approved his use of
force, in part because it followed the bloodbath provoked by the militant
supporters of Parliament. According to the findings gathered in midOctober of '93 by the National Center for Public Opinion Research, 20
percent of the respondents stated that Yeltsin's recourse to force was
timely and 35% believed that he waited too long to clamp down on his
opponents. The majority of those polled declared that Yeltsin had the right
to dissolve the Parliament. This judgment, which was not entirely

consistent with the then current constitution, showed that the population
was willing to disregard the legal niceties in the face of a severe political
crisis. However, the mood in the country soon changed once again.
Yeltsin's ratings slipped in November of 1993, which led to the defeat of
his allies during the December 12 Parliamentary election.
But subsequent events showed that Yeltsin might have been too hasty
suspending the constitution. I am talking about the December '93
Parliamentary elections. The disillusionment with the democratic process,
the pervasive economic hardship, and the failure of reformers to
coordinate their efforts translated into a surprising show of strength by
the ultra-nationalists led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As our findings show,
Zhirinovsky, the head of the mislabeled Liberal Democratic Party, drew his
support chiefly from the lower middle class. Those who voted for him were
people with a below-average education, employed in the sectors of the
economy vulnerable to unemployment, concerned about the crime
situation, and humiliated by Russia 's loss of a superpower status. While
the traditional Soviet working class voted for radical nationalists, older and
retired people were most prominent among the communist party
supporters. Nearly a third of those who gave their voice to Zhirinovsky
waited until election day to make up their mind. Few voters knew much
about Zhirinovsky and his party, most chose this venue as a way to
dramatize their displeasure with the reforms and the negative impact they
had on their standards of living. The vote for Zhirinovsky was mainly a
vote against the establishment. Some of his supporters already indicated
that they regretted their vote, so he might be a temporary phenomenon
on the Russian political scene. It is certainly too early to tell. What seems
perfectly clear now is that dismantling the old Russian and Soviet political
tradition and replacing it with a viable democratic civic culture will be a
long and arduous process.
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Appendix
Table 1
(% to the total answers)

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
I have always participated and
still participate in public life

10

13

7

4

3

Now I have a real opportunity for
participation

11

1

1

1

.5

There is still no real opportunity
for participation

33

22

21

17

19

Lately, I have lost interest in
public
life

-

12

14

16

16

I have no interest in politics

7

12

11

21

26

34

32

26

28

26

The most important question
today is the fate of our nation

Table 2
(% to the total answers)
1990

1991

1992

Hope

13

20

17

Confusion

23

27

24

Dispair

28

27

18

Confidence

6

6

5

Table 3

(% to the total answers)

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

Mikhail Gorbachev

51

44

16

14

1

Boris Yeltsin

5

19

44

38

17

